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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH

THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

Case No.
13642

VERA MASON,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal by defendant of her conviction
of threft in the Third District Court in and for Salt Lake
County, the Honorable Joseph G. Jeppson, presiding.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
In a jury trial in the lower court, defendant was
found guilty of third degree felony theft and subsequently
sentenced to be confined in the Utah State Prison by the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Honorable Joseph G. Jeppson for the indeterminate term
as provided by law for said crime.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks an affirmation of the lower court
decision.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The defendant was charged with the theft of a cash
register belonging to one Harold A. Lindsey on or about
the 18th day of September, 1973. The cash register was
located on the premises of a gas station owned by lindsey.
Lindsey in testimony in the lower court identified
defendant as the party driving the car used in the robbery.
The facts before the trial court were as follows: On
or about the 18th day of September, 1973, defendant
Vera Mason, accompanied by Melvin J. Thomas, drove
into a gas station owned and operated by Harold A.
Lindsey. Thomas asked Lindsey to put three dollars
worth of gas in the car (T. 10). While servicing the car
with gas Lindsey cleaned the car windows and at that
time observed defendant from a distance of not more
thn eighteen inches (T. 12). After receiving payment
for the gas from defendant (T. 13), Lindsey returned
to hi station office where Thomas asked him for change
to make a phone call (T. 13). Lindsey gave Thomas the
change and then left the office and continued servicing
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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a car in the lube bay (T. 13). Lindsey later became
suspicious after seeing Thomas stooped over the opened
back door of the car (T. 14), and returned to the station
office and found the cash register gone (T. 15). At the
same time he saw the car defendant was driving exit the
station at an excessive rate of speed (T. 16).
After the introduction of other testimony the defendant took the stand and denied that she had been in
Lindsey's station on the day in question (T. 65). On
cross-examination the prosecution in an attempt to impeach defendant's credibility asked the following questions:
"Q. Mrs. Mason, are you now under the
influence of any drugs?
MR. K U N K L E R : I will object to the
question. I don't see the relevancy.
MR. A N D E R S O N : I feel it goes to
her credibility, Your Honor.
T H E COURT:
A.

You may answer.

Somewhat, yes.

Q. By "somewhat", would you tell us
when you last took a drug and what it was ?
A.

About, let's see, about 8:30 this morn-

Q.

What did you take at 8:30 this morn-

A.

Heroin.

Q.

Heroin?

ing.
ing?
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A.
Q.
dict?

Yes.
Mrs. Mason are you a heroin ad-

MR. K U N K L E R : I object to the question. I don't think she would even know whether she was or not.
T H E COURT:

I sustain that objec-

tion.
Q.

How much heroin did you take?

MR. K U N K L E R :
the relativity.

I object. I don't see

T H E C O U R T : Overruled. How much?
A.

About two ten-dollar caps.

T H E COURT:

Two what?

THE W I T N E S S :
loons.

Ten-dollar bal-

Q.

Two ten-dollar ballons.

A.

Yes.

Q. Do you consider yourself now as being under full control of your faculties?
A.

Yes.

Q. Are you high?
A. No, I'm not.
The state then called David W. King, a police officer,
with extensive work in narcotics. To establish him as
an expert, the state questioned Officer King as to his
experience in the field of narcotics:
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Q. Would you tell us what this training and experience is, please?
A. I have had two and a half years in
narcotics. A year of that was spent in undercover living and making purchases of heroin
from heroin dealers and users, which by and
large in this state is basically the same. I have
been to a narcotics school. I have been to the
Maryland State Narcotics Seminar. I have
been, of course, to our Police Academy relaitve to narcotics investigations. And then my
experience has probably been by far the greatest teacher relative to narcotics investigations,
or observing people in narcotics, etc., different
types of narcotics.
Officer King then testified as to the probable affect of
defendant's use of heroin at the time of trial (T. 69-73).
After both sides rested their cases, the court specifically instructed the jury in the following manner.
T H E C O U R T : Members of the jury,
there has been some evidence introduced in this
case about the use of heroin. The Court instructs the jury this way. I won't put it in my
written instructions because I didn't anticipate
it and don't have anything prepared on that
in writing.
However, if you find that the defendant
has committed some other crime or some indiscretion that's not in the pleadings and of
which she is not charged with today you can't
find her guilty on the crime charged because
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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she's guilty of something elese. If she is guilty
of using heroin, you can't find her guilty of
this theft because she's guilty of heroin. I t isn't
a question of whether or not a person ought to
be punished it's a question of whether she's
guilty of this particular charge. And inasmuch
as you don't determine punishment, the Court
has to do that, you are to disregard this testimony about the use of heroin with reference to
punishment or guilt.
And furthermore, you are instructed not
to indulge in any bias or prejudice against her
because of the use of heroin. That is not the
crime that is charged.
Now, the testimony has been admitted
and the Court let it in for one purpose only,
and that purpose is for you to try to determine
what her mental condition is right now, that is,
at the time she testified. And you have had
some testimony about how much she took and
when, and you may consider that just in determining whether you can believe what she has
testified to, whether she's able to testify coherently and reasonably about things that happened on the date on which she is charged with
this theft charge. So you consider it to determine her present mental condition as you can
properly evaluate her testimony. But it's not
to be prejudicial against her on the particular
charge. . . (T-75-76)
The jury after deliberating found defendant guilty
of the charge.
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

7
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
NO ERROR WAS PRESENT IN THE CROSSEXAMINATION OF DEFENDANT AS TO
HER USE OF DRUGS ON THE DAY OF
TRIAL.
A. THE INJECTION BY DEFENDANT OF
TWO "BALLOONS" OF HEROIN ON
THE MORNING OF THE TRIAL WAS
A PROPER SUBJECT FOR CROSS-EXAMINATION IN ORDER TO EVALUATE HER CREDIBILITY AS A WITNESS.
Respondent respectfully submits that the lower court
properly overruled defense counsel's objection to the
state's cross-examination of defendant-appellant as to
her use and addition to drugs at the time of trial. Rule
20, Utah Rules of Evidence states:
"Subject to rules 21 and 22, for the purposes of impairing or supporting the credibility of a witness, any party including the
party calling him may examine him and introduce extrinsic evidence concerning any statement or conduct by him and any other matter
relevant upon the issue of credibility. (Emphasis added.)
The above cited rule specifically provides that a witness
may be examined as to his or her conduct or "any other
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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matter relevant upon the issue of credibility." The recognized debilitating affect upon the mental processes of
drug addiction requires that the jury be informed of such
drug addiction so that in th einterest of justice, the testimony of the drug user may be properly evaluated. The
very essence of the American judicial system is the presentation of credible evidence before the trier of fact to
enable the rendering of a just verdict based on facts
adduced from said evidence together with the applicable
law. In determining the credibility of the evidence presented, justice requires that an examination of the source
be made.
The above view has been set forth in an annotation
on the use of drugs as affecting the credibility of a witness, 52 A. L. R. 2d 848, which sets forth the majority
view as allowing the introduction of such evidence when
it is proven:
"that the witness was under the [opium,
morphine or similar drugs] influence at the
time of the occurrences as to which he testifies
or at the time of the trial, or that his mind or
memory or powers of observation were affected
by the habit." (Emphasis added.) 52 A. L. R.
2d 848.
This same excerpt is alluded to in appellant's brief but
never cited in text. As can be seen, while questioning
as to addiction to drugs may be irrelevant in determining
the witness' propensity for truth, it is relevant as to
capacity where, as in the case at bar, the witness admits
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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that she had on the morning of the trial injected "two
ten-dollar caps" of heroin (T. 67).
The Supreme Court of Kansas adopted this view
in the case of State v. Belote, 213 Kan. 291, 516 P. 2d
159 (1973). In this case the Court ruled proper the restriction of cross-examination as to drug use of the state's
undercover agent where it was shown that neither at the
time of the alleged purchase testified of nor at the time
of trial was the witness under the influence of narcotics.
It should be noted that a rule of evidence identical to
our Rule 20, at K. S. A. 60-420, in addition to the annotation at 52 A. L. R. 2d 848 previously cited served as
authority for this restriction. A like position was adhered to by the Arizona Supreme Court in the case of
State v. Reyes, 99 Ariz. 257, 408 P. 2d 400 (1965), where
said court held:
"The trial court did not err in sustaining
the objection to the question 'Have you ever
taken heroin yourself?' The question is too
broad. Generally a witness may be cross-examined as to whether he is under the influence of
drugs at the time of testifying. [Citations
omitted.] In the instant case the court did permit testimony as to the witness being under the
influence of drugs at the time of his testimony.
'Q. Are you under the influence of
of drugs right now?
'A.
added.)

No, sir.'" Id at 402. (Emphasis
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Once again the general rule as set forth in appellant's
brief is that an individual witness for purposes of impeachment may be cross-examined as to whether he is under
the influence of drugs at the time of testifying. For other
holdings in conformity with this rule see: People v.
Perez, 239 Cal. App. 2d 1, 48 Cal. Rptr. 596 (1966);
United States v. Folwer, 465 F. 2d 664 (D. C. Cir. 1972);
Wilson v. United States, 232 U. S. 563, 34 S. Ct. 347, 58
L. Ed. 728 (1918); United States v. Butler, 481 F. 2d 531
(D. C. Cir. 1973); People v. Smith, 4 Cal. App. 3d 403,
64 Cal. Rptr. 412 (1970); Isonhood v. State, (Miss.) 274
So. 2d 685 (1973).
A more liberal rule would allow cross-examination as
to drug abuse generally at the time of trial without the
need to establish drug addiction. See State v. Cox, (Missouri 352 S. W. 2d 665 (1962); State v. Collins, (Missouri) 383 S. W. 2d 747 (1964), People v. Strother, 53
111. 2d 95, 290 N. E. 2d 201 (1972).
From the authorities here set forth and acknowledged in appellant's brief no error was committed in
allowing defendant to be cross-examined as to her addiction to drugs at the time of trial.
B. PROPER FOUNDATION WAS PRESENT IN THE CROSS-EXAMINATION
OF DEFENDANT AS TO HER USE OF
DRUGS ON THE DAY OF THE TRIAL.
Appellant maintains that reversible error was committed because of a lack of proper foundation in the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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prosecution's impeachment of defendant. While quick
to make this naked allegation, appellant fails to specify
wherein the prosecution failed to establish proper foundation. At trial an objection was raised on grounds of
irrelevance when the issue of defendant's drug addiction
was raised. On appeal, defendant-appellant concedes that
drug addiction at the time of trial is a relevant issue for
the purposes of impeachment but then contradicts this
statement by maintaining that reversible error was committed because the prosecution failed to establish proper
foundation, i.e., failed to establish the relevancy of the
inquiry as to drug addiction in the lower court. The inconsistency of this position is obvious.
As previously set forth in both briefs, drug addiction
at the time of trial or at the time of the event testified
of is extremely relevant with respect to the weight to be
afforded the testimony of a particular witness. The question was therefore proper and the lower court properly
overruled defense counsel's objection.
Appellant cites as authority the case of People v.
Telio, 1 111. App. 3d 526, 275 N. E. 2d 222 (1971), for the
proposition that reversible error is committed when crossexamination is commenced on the question of drug use
without proper foundation. Respondent would point out
that the Illinois court, while finding error in such a practice, stated that said error did not form sufficient grounds
for reversal. Therefore, even if in the case at bar proper
foundation was not laid, no basis for reversal would exist.
Respondent respectfully submits that proper foundaDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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tion was present in the questioning of defendant as to
her use of drugs at the time of trial. Respondent further
submits that even if proper foundation was not laid, such
error was not of sufficient magnitude in light of the eyewitness identification of defendant as the party driving
the car involved in the robbery of the service station, to
warrant reversal.
C. APPELLANT'S ADMISSION IN OPEN
COURT THAT SHE HAD INJECTED
TWO BALLOONS OF HEROIN THE
MORNING OF THE TRIAL, TOGETHER
WITH EXPERT TESTIMONY AS TO
THE EFFECT OF SUCH AN INTAKE
WAS SUFFICIENT FOR PURPOSES OF
IMPEACHMENT.
Defendant-appellant admitted under cross-examination that at the time of trial she was under the influence
of a narcotic drug (T. 66). Upon further quesitioning
she testified that she had taken two "ten-dollar ballons"
of heroin at 8:30 the morning of trial (T. 67). These
admissions by defendant were sufficient to serve as a
basis for impeachment and it was not necessary for the
prosecution to introduce further evidence of drug use
at the time of trial. The introduction of further evidence,
i.e., requiring defendant to display any needle tracks in
her arms, etc., would possibly have unduly influenced
the jury. Once again such a showing was not required
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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since defendant voluntarily admitted that she was under
the influence of the drug heroin at the time of trial.
Appellant cites the case of People v. Ortega, 2 Cal.
App. 3d 888, 83 Cal. Rptr. 260 (1969) for the proposition
that the prosecution is required to introduce independent evidence of drug use at critical times. It should be
noted that this case may be distinguished from the case
at bar for the following reasons. In the present action,
unlike, Ortega, the witness voluntarily admitted that she
was under the influence of drugs at the time of trial. In
addition, nowhere in the present action does there appear
the badgering type questioning on the use of drugs that
was present in Ortega. There does not here exist the
insinuation in the prosecution's questions that appeared
in Ortega. For the above reasons respondent respectfully
submits that the cross-examination was proper in all
respect.
POINT II.
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION IN ALLOWING OFFICER
DAVID W. KING TO TESTIFY AS TO THE
PROBABLE EFFECTS ON DEFENDANT OF
HER DRUG USE AT THE TIME OF TRIAL.
Utah law provides for the use of expert testimony
or the use of opinion testimony:
(2) If the witness is testifying as an expert, testimony of the witness in the form of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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opinions or inferences is limited to such opinions as the judge finds are (a) based on facts
or data perceived by or personally known or
made known to the witness at the hearing and
(b) within the scope of the special knowledge,
skill, experience or training possessed by the
witness.
(3) Unless the judge excludes the testimony he shall be deemed to have made the finding requisite to its admission. Rule 56, Utah
Rules of Evidence. (Emphasis added.)
This rule supports respondent's position that Officer
King's testimony was admissible as expert testimony. An
expert is appropriately used to enable the jury to better
understand matters properly before the court. Whether
or not a particular witness has the required expertise,
experience, special knowledge or training is left to the
discretion of the trial judge. The judge's failure to exclude testimony evidences that the necessary finding was
made. See Rule 56, Supra.
The exercise of such discretion will not be quickly
overruled on appeal.
It is well settled in Utah that a trial judge has wide
discretion in determining whether proper foundation has
been laid for opinion evidence. In Road Commission v.
Silliman, 22 Utah 2d 33, 34, 418 P. 2d 347, 348 (1968),
this Court held as follows:
"The qualification of an expert witness is
to be determined by the trial judge, and if he
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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determines that a witness by reason of training
and experience can assist the jury by giving
an opinion on a matter properly before the
court, we on appeal should not hold that testimony should be stricken unless such palpable
ignorance of the subject matter is manifested
by the witness as to indicate an abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge in allowing
the witness to express an opinion in the first
place or in refusing to grant a motion to strike
after it has been given."
Accord: Marsh v. Irvine, 22 Utah 2d 154, 449 P. 2d
996 (1969); Stagmeyer v. Leatham Bros., Inc., 20 Utah
2d 421, 439 P. 2d 279 (1969).
In the case at bar the prosecution established Officer
King as an expert in the following manner:
"Q. Would you tell us what this training and experience [in narcotics is please?
A. I have received two and a half years
in narcotics. A year of that was spent in undercover living and making purchases of heroin
from heroin dealers and users, which by and
large in this state is basically the same. I have
been to a narcotics school. I have been to the
Maryland State Narcotics Seminar. I have
been, of course, to our Police Academy relative to narcotics' investigations. And my experience has probably been by far the greatest
teacher relative to narcotics investigations, or
observing people in narcotics, etc., different
types of narcotics," (T. 70).
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That Officer King's extensive experience qualified him
as an expert is evidenced by the court's failure to exclude
his testimony. The presumption of correctness must necessarily follow.
Appellant contends that she was unduly prejudiced
by Officer King's testimony generally and specifically because of some of his answers. Respondent respectfully
submits that the inability to specifically respond to questions put to him combined with possible instances of
vagueness went to the weight to be afforded his testimony. Such an evaluation is clearly the prerogative of
a jury and not a proper subject for appeal unless there
is a clear abuse. No such abuse is here presented.
Even if error was to be found in the testimony of
Officer King such error was inconsequential in light of
the clear and convincing evidence pointing to defendant's
guilt. As previously stated, defendant was without question identified as the driver of the car involved in the
theft of a cash register from Harold A. Lindsey. Further,
as noted in respondent's statement of the facts, the court
specifically instructed the jury that defendant's use of
heroin could only be considered as it affected her ability
to testify on the day of trial (T. 75-76).
For the above reason appellant respectfully submits
that the testimony of Officer King was properly before
the court and no reversible error was committed in the
presentation of said testimony.
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CONCLUSION
The testimony of defendant as to her addiction to
drugs at the time of trial and the testimony of Officer
King as to the affect of said drug use being properly before the lower court, respondent respectfully submits that
no basis exists for reversal of the jury verdict of guilty
in the lower court and the same should be sustained.
Respectfully submitted,
VERNON B. ROMNEY
Attorney General
WILLIAM W. BARRETT
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Respondent

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

